ESSAY
CLASS ACTION MECHANISMS IN THE COMPARATIVE
CONTEXTS:
A LAW AND ECONOMICS PERSPECTIVE
Jing-Huey Shao*
ABSTRACT
Class actions are designed to provide claimants a mechanism by
which to enforce their rights with objectives including achieving
access to justice, being compensated, and deterring misconduct. The
significant impact of class disputes on society brings both common
law and civil law countries’ attention to the promotion of more
efficient enforcement. Through identifying the features of class
actions, this study categorizes class action mechanisms into three
major types for the purpose of economic analysis: Common Law
Type, Civil Law Type A, and Civil Law Type B. A model comprising
transaction cost, risk, and incentive, three important factors related
to an economic analysis of law, is adopted to evaluate which type of
class action is more likely to attain the aforementioned objectives.
The results show that Common Law and Civil Law Type B are the two
more favorable options with respect to class action designs as Civil
Law Type A failed to meet the objectives. However, since class actions
reflect some public good nature, a contract failure problem is
unavoidable when using private enforcement to pursue public good.
While there is no perfect model, non-profit organizations with
appropriate governmental intervention are suggested as an option
to overcome such restraint.
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I. INTRODUCTION

In recent years, class action procedures have flourished
across the globe, and are usually accompanied by animated debate
and controversy. Individuals, non-profit organizations, and public
officials are pursuing remedies for mass harms: injuries caused by
defective products or pollution, financial losses resulting from
violations of antitrust law, corporate, and securities law, etc. While
the United States is renowned for such mechanisms, other
countries are developing mechanisms for mass dispute resolution
in the form of several variations. Class action or similar
mechanisms, such as representative action or aggregate action, 1
are gradually being adopted by many jurisdictions. With many
variants around the world, it is necessary to determine how they
1. Deborah R. Hensler, The Global Landscape of Collective Litigation, in CLASS ACTIONS
IN CONTEXT: HOW ECONOMICS, POLITICS AND CULTURE SHAPE COLLECTIVE LITIGATION 3 (Deborah
R. Hensler et al. eds., 2016).
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have been performed and whether they are effective in a
comparative context. Not surprisingly, due to the complexity of the
mechanisms and the difficulties in comparing distinctive
jurisdictions, little scholarly work has been done to study how
these procedures operate in practice.
While it is important to know how to litigate or defend in a
class action in foreign countries as transactions and business are
more multi-national and global, transnational litigation adds to the
challenges presented by class actions including multi-state
plaintiffs or defendants. Knowledge related to different types of
class actions around the world now becomes crucial. For instance,
courts encounter jurisdiction or enforcement issues regarding
litigation arising out of the same facts but involving foreign
nationals whose countries enforce different types of class or
aggregate procedures. The aforementioned issues require judges
to cope with questions as to whether their citizens are bound by
the class judgment or settlements arrived at forum state or
elsewhere.2 To address this issue, US federal courts have held that
to certify a class including foreign nationals, the court must
consider whether foreign courts, having no class action procedure
of their own, would enforce US class action judgments.3 Also, it is
common for jurisdictions outside the United States to have courts
that deal with whether to recognize or to enforce US court
judgments, particularly when they do not have the same type of
class action mechanisms to include absent plaintiffs under opt-out
designs.4
It will undoubtedly be an enormous mission to understand
each type of class action at the global level. Hensler, Hodges, and
Tzankova have contributed a substantial amount of valuable
information and insights into this field from an empirical
perspective by collecting national reporters from several countries
to establish basic distinctions. Also, there has been literature
covering topics as broad as introducing various kinds of class
action mechanisms, or as specific as discussing particular issues in
certain types of class actions. However, there has not been much
2. Deborah R. Hensler, The Future of Mass Litigation: Global Class Actions and ThirdParty Litigation Funding, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 306, 310 (2011).
3. Id. at 310. Linda Sandstrom Simard & Jay Tidmarsh, Foreign Citizens in
Transnational Class Actions, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 87 (2011).
4. Sandstrom Simard & Tidmarsh, supra note 3, at 87.
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research directly comparing different systems from an economic
perspective. Klement and Weinshall-Margel recently put forth a
cost benefit analysis of class actions from an Israeli point of view
and proposed an analytical framework for evaluating the
effectiveness of class actions. Their analysis focuses on whether
class actions raise overall net social welfare.5 One of the features
that makes this Essay distinct from previous studies is that it puts
the emphasis on the plaintiff side in analyzing one of the major
problems with collective actions: access to justice, since there has
been relatively little use of the procedure to date in most other
countries outside the United States. 6 Since there are many
participants in a class action with different economic perspectives,
plaintiffs directly influence whether class actions can take place,
which implies the effectiveness of access to justice. An economic
analysis would be one of the feasible ways to approach this
question, especially when obtaining empirical data worldwide is
difficult.
The main objectives of class actions that are generally
recognized include compensation, deterrence, and access to
justice. 7 While access to justice is the threshold question of
compensation and the two are usually being discussed together,
deterrence is usually categorized as another issue. The deterrence
effect of class actions has been commonly accepted in the United
States. Conversely, studies regarding the same effect in other
jurisdictions are still inadequate. This is especially critical for
jurisdictions that have low utilization rate of class actions and
where tortfeasors such as enterprises may be under-deterred from
their wrongful acts.
Through an economic analysis, it is possible to determine
whether these class action mechanisms have met their set goals,
while at the same time minimizing costs. For this analysis, instead
of using specific countries for comparison, the Author simplified
and categorized different types of class action mechanisms into a
5. Alon Klement & Keren Weinshall-Margel, Cost–Benefit Analysis of Class Actions: An
Israeli Perspective, 172 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 75, 81 (2016).
6. Hensler, supra note 2, at 309.
7. Klement & Weinshall-Margel, supra note 5, at 82. The objectives of class actions
include: (1) enforcing the law and deterring future violations, (2) exercising the right of
access to the court, especially for disadvantaged groups or individuals, and (3) providing
compensation for injured parties.
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few major types according to the features identified by previous
studies. Regarding the access to justice and compensation
objectives, by outlining the parameters for measuring the costs and
benefits relevant to these objectives, the Author assessed the
utility for the principals and agents in each type of class action. The
framework of this analysis consists of the consideration of
transaction costs, risk, and incentive which are based on classical
microeconomic literature. With respect to the deterrence effect,
the Author referred to the theoretical framework from punishment
literature and transform it into explaining class actions. The
aforementioned analyses are combined together to examine the
merits and limitations in different types of class action
mechanisms, followed by discussions and recommendations.
II. LITERATURE REVIEW
For many years after Rule 23 of US Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure was adopted, the United States was not only the center
of class action litigation, but was virtually the only jurisdiction that
permitted class actions. The opt-out mechanism in conjunction
with enormous punitive awards creates a formidable weapon for
plaintiffs against defendants in mass disputes. With the power and
great incentives that attract numerous entrepreneur lawyers and
plaintiffs to file suits in the United States, the potential
consequences of such US-style class actions have triggered great
controversy. First, plaintiffs’ attorneys in class actions are subject
to only minimal monitoring by dispersed clients, which raises the
specter that the entrepreneurial attorneys serve their own interest
at the expense of the client. 8 Also, the aggregation of lawsuits
increase the bargaining power of the plaintiffs, which induces
frivolous lawsuits that force the defendants to settle to avoid
potentially outrageous judgment awards. Some scholars believe
the regulatory structure of the US class actions is poorly designed
in a number of respects, particularly when applied to “large-scale,
small-claim” litigation where the overall liability is large, but the
individual interests of the class members are small.9 With such a
8. Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs’ Attorney’s Role in Class Action
and Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and Recommendation For Reform, 58 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1, 3 (1991).
9. Id.
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significant impact on the landscape of class dispute resolution,
certain critical concerns still lie within US class actions.
However, since the comments have turned against class
actions in the United States, class actions and other group litigation
procedures seem to have gained attention in other parts of the
world. Outside the United States, class actions have been
authorized in the Quebec province in 1973 and spread to other
Canadian provinces in the early 1990s. 10 Australia adopted a
federal class action rule in 1992, which was followed by its states
in the late 1990s. 11 On virtually every continent, one or more
nations have adopted some sort of aggregated or representative
litigation procedure. 12 At least twenty-one of the twenty-five
largest economies in the world have adopted some type of class
action, most in the last twenty years.13 In the case of jurisdictions
that have rejected representative litigation, they also have
instituted group litigation procedures to manage mass disputes.14
Countries have adopted class actions diversely. In other words, the
these procedures vary considerably regarding who has standing to
sue, scope, remedies, and whether the procedure requires or
allows class members to opt in or opt out.15 These variations in key
features are included as the parameters used here in the analysis
of different class actions.
Our analytical model includes transaction cost, risk, and
incentive which are three important factors that are commonly
used in microeconomics to evaluate different types of class actions.
The issue of transaction cost was initially raised by Ronald Coase
in his articles “The Nature of the Firm” 16 and “The Problem of
Social Cost.”17 In Coase’s view, firms and markets are alternative
governance structures that differ in terms of their transaction
costs. Transaction cost is viewed as the price mechanism utilized
by different governance structures. Henceforth, transaction costs
10. Hensler, supra note 2, at 306.
11. Id.
12. Hensler, supra note 1, at 3.
13. Id.
14. Hensler, supra note 2, at 307.
15. Id. The variations in key features are: Standing: (1) public officials; (2) licensed
associations; (3) private actors. Scope: (1) limited; (2) transsubstantive. Remedies: (1)
injunctive or declaratory; (2) damages. Procedure: (1) opt-in; (2) opt-out.
16. R. H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA (NEW SERIES) 386 (1937).
17. R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & ECON. 1, 2 (1960).
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in this Essay are referred to as the “cost of running system”18 from
the plaintiff perspective. While the idea of “transaction cost”
conceptualized by Coase is the most rudimentary form of this
concept, it has been successively expounded by later economists
with amplified theories and evidence. To sort out an unambiguous
categorization of the transaction cost for comparative studies, in
this study, the classification of transaction costs done by Carl
Dahlman in his article “The Problem of Externality” is adopted.19
Dahlman groups transaction costs into three types based on the
different phases of contract-making: search and information cost,
bargaining and decision cost, and policing and enforcement cost.20
Also, the Author refers to the categorization of “cost of justice,”
which includes “monetary cost, opportunity cost, and intangible
cost” proposed by Gramatikov et al. 21 In a typical class action,
particularly if individual loss is small, but the number of people
who suffer from the damages and injuries is large, there will be no
incentive for an individual to initiate a lawsuit. Hence, with respect
to the aforementioned objectives of compensation and access to
justice, the threshold question is whether the mechanism can
lower the transaction cost more than the benefit it creates, just as
Charles Silver believes that transaction cost is a significant
parameter in determining collective willingness to enter lawsuit
procedures.22 Hence, this Essay particularly focuses on the plaintiff
side since there are still not enough discussions on the relationship
between claimants and their attorneys outside the United States.
The other important factors utilized in this Essay are
incentive and risk. The very first person to make an incentive
analysis of sharecropping was Adam Smith in 1776.23 Also, Steve
Cheung made a systematic incentive, risk, and transaction cost
analysis of a contractual arrangement on sharecropping in the late
18. Aric Rindfleisch & Jan B. Heide, Transaction Cost Analysis: Past, Present, and
Future Applications, 61 J. MARKETING 30, 31 (1997).
19. Carl J. Dahlman, The Problem of Externality, 22 J. L. & ECON. 141 (1979).
20. Id.
21. MARTIN GRAMATIKOV ET AL., A HANDBOOK FOR MEASURING THE COSTS AND QUALITY OF
ACCESS TO JUSTICE 68 (2010).
22. Charles M. Silver, Class Actions – Representative Proceedings, 7600 ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF L. & ECON. 194 (1999), https://reference.findlaw.com/lawandeconomics/7600-classactions.pdf [https:/perma.cc/KE5F-BLWN].
23. See generally ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS (Edwin Cannan ed., 2003) (first
published in 1776).
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1960s. Cheung believes that “the choice of contractual
arrangement is made so as to maximize the gain from risk
dispersion subject to the constraint of transaction costs.”24 While
incentive, risk, and transaction cost are the three basic elements of
microeconomics, the fact that law and economics should consider
them is usually attributed to Guido Calabresi, who argued that, for
accidents, there are primary costs, secondary costs, and tertiary
costs, which are believed here to reflect the spirit of incentive, risk,
and transaction cost, respectively.25
The other objective (deterrence) mainly addresses a problem
where violation of a legal duty results in dispersed harm to
numerous individuals. When each individual’s loss does not justify
pursuing its recovery in court, producers of mass harm might not
be sufficiently deterred from violating their legal duties. Class
actions address this problem by aggregating small individual
claims into “marketable” lawsuits by creating a procedural
mechanism that incentivizes representing plaintiffs and attorneys
to identify suitable causes of action and to litigate them in court.26
One of the ways to estimate deterrence value is by observing the
change in defendants’ behavior in expectation of being subject to
class actions. However, such observations are difficult to obtain.27
Hence, this Essay refers to the deterrence and punishment
literature as the tool for economic analysis. The theory of
punishment and deterrence started with Becker presenting his
idea about developing an optimal decision to combat illegal
behavior, in which the variables are the probability that an offense
is discovered and the size of the punishment from the perspective
of criminal law. 28 This concept was later applied to civil law
schemes, where scholars believed that when there are
enforcement errors that enable injurers to externalize social cost,
punitive damages are required to align expected liability and social
cost, as well as to solve the under-deterrence problem by

24 . Steven N. S. Cheung, Transaction Costs, Risk Aversion, and the Choice of
Contractual Arrangements, 12 J. L. & ECON. 23, 25 (1964).
25. See generally GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COST OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS (1970).
26. Klement & Weinshall-Margel, supra note 5, at 75.
27. Id. at 81.
28. Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON.
169, 170 (1968).
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increasing the amount of the sanction. 29 While the enforcement
error term may vary from the probability of escaping liability to
the probability of punishment, these labels basically indicate
similar ideas and serve the same function: to determine punitive
multipliers that are intended to be equal to the reciprocal of the
enforcement error.30 Through applying the punitive multipliers to
the damage amount, it becomes possible to compare the
deterrence effect among different types of class actions.
III. RESEARCH MODELS
By applying a model consisting of transaction cost, risk, and
incentive, we aim to evaluate which type of class action is more
likely to attain the objectives of access to courts, compensation,
and deterrence. For the first two goals, the costs are estimated
against the benefits by separately outlining the parameters for
claimants (principals) and attorneys (agents) since they may have
different economic perspectives or conflicts of interest. Of the
functions, all the constituents of the transaction cost, either prelitigation or in-litigation, are taken into account. The information
cost interlinks two phases of the litigation, which include the cost
of searching for an attorney (pre-litigation) and the cost of
evidence-collecting (during litigation), as well as costs in
association with other information collection efforts. Information
cost can also be broken down into the cost for use of information,
discovery related costs, witness’ compensation, experts’ fees, and
service for summons. The bargaining cost between a client and
her/his attorney usually takes place before the litigation process
on the content of legal service agreements. The monitoring cost is
indispensable for the client to ensure the subsequent proceeding
of the lawsuit. As the litigation proceeds, the court fee contains
items ranging from filling fees, translators’ fees, notary’s fees, to
copying and other overheads. Last but not least, attorney fees are
in all the phases and procedures of the lawsuit. Encompassing the
aforementioned, inclusive utility functions for the principal
(claimant) and the agent (attorney) are as follows:
29. Robert D. Cooter, Economic Analysis of Punitive Damages, S. CAL. L. REV. 56, 79
(1982-1983); Mitchell A. Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages Economic Analysis,
111 HARV. L. REV. 869, 873 (1998).
30. Id.
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(1.0) U=B–TC
(1.1) Up=Bp–TCp
(1.2) Ua=Ba–TCa

U denotes the utility in consideration of benefit against
transaction cost. B, TC, p and a represent Benefit, Transaction Cost,
principal, and agent, respectively. Risk and incentive, although not
appearing in the formula in the basic function, are taken into
account when evaluating transaction costs and benefits, and
appear in later various functions. While the analytic model is fairly
straightforward, the variations in different jurisdictions make the
constituents of the function highly distinct from one another.
As to the cost part, the Author also outline parameters
separately for principal and agent. For principals, because
claimants have to search for agents, negotiate with them, and
monitor them during the process, the basic function include all the
constituents Dahlman listed. Also, because the claimants have to
spend time and effort in a general sense, cost of justice is included
as well. Litigation costs, which are illustrated as court fees here, is
contingent upon whether the jurisdiction adopts American rule or
English rule (cost-shifting). Attorney fees are also indispensable to
the cost for principals unless it was a contingency fee arrangement.
Hence, a more detailed function for principals can be broken down
as follows:
Transaction cost for Principal= Information cost+ Bargaining
cost+ Monitoring cost +Cost of justice +Court fee+ Attorney fee
TCp= ICp + BCp + MCp +CJ + CF + AF

As for agents, the constituents taken into consideration under
the framework are basically the same as those for the principals.
However, the meaning of each constituent and the results are not
the same. Information cost for attorneys mainly refers to the cost
during the litigation. Also, although there are bargaining costs
when entering into a legal service contract, there is neither a
monitoring cost from the attorney side, nor cost of justice or court
fees for processing the cases. Therefore, the function for the agent
is as follows:
Transaction cost for Agent= Information cost+ Bargaining cost
TCa= ICa + BCa
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With respect to the benefits, for most jurisdictions, principals
are the ones who shoulder and care about the case results since
they pay the costs and receive the judgment award. In other words,
they bear the risk and are incentivized by the benefit against the
transaction cost. The expected benefit is the prevailing rate for the
litigation multiplied by the judgment award, minus the attorney
fee. Here, with “w” denoting the winning rate of the case, the
benefit for the principal can be illustrated as follows:
Benefit for Principal= w(Judgment award)
Bp=w(JA)

Attorneys in most jurisdictions charge by the case or by the
hour regardless of the case outcome. Therefore, the benefit for the
agent is comparatively simple, i.e. the fee they receive for their
services.
Benefit for Agent=Attorney fee
Ba=AF

IV. TYPES OF CLASS ACTION MECHANISMS
Although class action mechanisms are developed based on
their distinct social and economic backgrounds, as well as their
legal legacies, they follow a few major models. The Author
categorize them herein according to their features instead of
rigidly sorting them by their jurisdictions. Based on the critical
features identified in previous studies, three types of class actions
are highlighted for the purpose of the economic analysis: Common
Law Type (US type), Civil Law Type A, and Civil Law Type B, which
we believe covers a substantial percentage of the types of class
actions.
A. Basic Features of Common Law Class Actions
Because class action is comparatively mature in the US legal
system, it is referred to as a representative example of the Common
Law Type. 31 Rule 23 of the US Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
31. Deborah Hensler et al., The Globalization of Class Actions: An Overview, 622 ANN.
AM. ACADEMY OF POL. & SOC. SCI. 7, 10 (2009). See also Amichai Magen & Peretz Segal, The
Globalization of Class Actions National Report: Israel, GLOBAL CLASS ACTION EXCHANGE,
http://globalclassactions.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/documents/Israel_National_R
eport.pdf [https://perma.cc/KWF8-F99K] (last visited Sept. 10, 2019).
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specifies the main features of US class actions. To qualify as a class
action, a lawsuit must be certified by the court. After the
certification, the court appoints a class counsel. Class actions
involving damage claims certified under Rule 23(b)(3) are subject
to specific notice and opt-out requirements. 32 Additionally, Rule
23(e) and 23(h) stipulate the court’s authority to review the
settlements and attorney fees of class actions.33 Beside the stated
procedural features of US class actions, the most influential factor
that motivates the initiation of class actions by attorneys is the
huge financial incentive comprised of enormous punitive awards
and contingency fee arrangements that are prevalent in class
actions.34
B. Basic Features of Civil Law Class Actions
Most of the civil law countries adopt class action mechanisms
by using opt-in designs to aggregate claimants, with some minor
variations. This is because civil law countries still feel
uncomfortable about accepting “absent parties” to be class
members with opt-out designs, which is a departure from the
traditional civil procedure, especially concerning res judicata
issues.35 They offer significantly less compensation as compared to
common law countries because civil law countries do not apply
punitive damage unless the law specifies that it is necessary to do
so. Even if punitive damages are stipulated by law, the damage
amount is usually capped by a certain fixed amount or within a
specific fixed multiplier of the actual damage. Also, contingency fee
arrangements are prohibited or only allowed under restrictions in
most civil law countries. 36 Besides the referenced common
32. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3).
33. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(h).
34 . Wallace Wen-Yeu Wang & Chen Jian-Lin, Reforming China’s Securities Civil
Actions: Lessons From U.S. PSLRA Reform and Taiwan’s Government-Sanctioned Non-Profit,
21 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 115, 135 (2008).
35. Jing-Huey Shao, Class Action Mechanisms in Chinese and Taiwanese Contexts–A
mixture of Private and Public Law, 28 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 237, 279 (2014).
36. See Taipei Bar Association Professional Legal Ethics art. 35, TAIPEI BAR ASS’N,
https://www.lawbank.com.tw/treatise/lawrela.aspx?lsid=FL010136&ldate=20030907&
lno=1 [https://perma.cc/5RLX-2SWC] (last visited Sept. 10, 2019). Contingency fee
arrangements are prohibited in certain types of cases. Even if it is allowed, the Taipei Bar
Association capped the total fees that attorneys can charge per case, which substantially
limits the revenue of attorneys who represent class actions. See also Charter of the Taipei
Bas
Association
art.
29,
TAIPEI
BAR
ASS’N,
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features, the class action mechanisms in civil law countries can
further be divided into two types.
1. Civil Law Type A
The Civil Law Type A (“Type A”) class action mechanism
facilitates the aggregation of claimants by simplifying the filing
procedure. If the plaintiff petitions and the court considers it
appropriate, the court can issue a public notice for potential
claimants to join the lawsuit by registration or by some other
similar means.37 Other than the stated feature, this type of class
action is essentially identical to traditional joinder claims or
intervention claims used for solving multiple-party disputes.
2. Civil Law Type B
The Civil Law Type B (“Type B”) class action mechanism
confers non-profit organizations (“NPOs”) or governmentsanctioned non-profit organizations (“GSOs”), such as trade unions
or labor unions, to bring class actions under special laws. 38 By
enjoying the advantages in terms of litigation specified by laws,
such as court fee discounts or exemption of securities for
injunctions in bringing class actions,39 the qualified organizations
http://www.rootlaw.com.tw/LawArticle.aspx?LawID=A040090030002700-0890901
[https://perma.cc/TG2H-X26S](last visited Sept. 10, 2019).
37. See Taiwan Code of Civil Procedure art. 44-2, JUDICIAL YUAN REPUBLIC OF CHINA,
available
at
https://law.moj.gov.tw/ENG/LawClass/LawAll.aspx?pcode=B0010001
[https://perma.cc/7KZ4-GD9C] (Litigants whose common interests have arisen from the
same transaction or occurrence may appoint one or more persons from themselves to sue
on behalf of them. The court may publish a notice for other persons with the same common
interests to join such action within a designated period of time). See also Civil Procedure
Law of the People’s Republic of China (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s
Cong., Apr. 9, 1991, art. 55), reprinted in THE CIVIL PROCEDURE LAW AND COURT RULES OF THE
PEOPLET’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (Wei Luo ed., 2006) (“Where a case has numerous litigants but
the exact number of the litigants is uncertain, the court may issue a public notice to inform
those interested persons who are entitled to the claim to register their rights with the court
within a designated period of time”).
38. Public officials are utilized in some jurisdictions. See Hensler, supra note 1, at 7.
However, for the sake of simplicity, we exclude them for the analysis as they have
commonalities with GSOs.
39. For example, Article 52 of Taiwan Consumer Protection Law stipulates, “[i]f a
consumer protection group brings a litigation in accordance with Article 50 in its own
name, the court fees for the portion of the claim exceeding NT$600,000 shall be waived.”
Consumer Protection Law, art. 52 (Taiwan). Also, Article 53 specifies that the court fee for
such litigation shall be exempted. Id. art. 53.
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provide a more convenient means for potential claimants to opt-in
the class. Although this type of mechanism does not exclude other
individuals or entities from initiating suits, a qualified organization
generally has a more advantageous position to file class actions.
Also, these NPOs or GSOs are nominally the plaintiffs in most
situations because the jurisdictions of this type of class actions
hold that this type of group has standing to sue for mass disputes.40
V. THE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF CLASS ACTION MECHANISMS
A. Common Law Type
For the Common Law Type, once the court has certified a
class, the potential claimants who are included in the class simply
need to decide whether to opt-out of the class or not. 41 Hence,
almost no transaction cost occurs in searching for attorneys,
joining the lawsuit, or negotiating among the parties and with the
agents. Also, they usually have enormous size classes due to the
fact that the claimants have been automatically included in the
class, 42 and where attorneys bore the relevant costs for them
under contingency fee arrangements, which constitutes positive
incentives for them to stay in the class.43
On the other hand, under such contingency fee structures, the
attorneys for plaintiffs will generally advance the expenses of the
class actions and will be reimbursed only if the action is favorable.
Hence, they estimate the cost and the expected reward beforehand
to determine if the action justifies the risks being undertaken. 44
While contingency fee arrangements associated with punitive
awards create a huge incentive to motivate lawyers to undertake
large cases, they are subject to very limited monitoring by the
disorganized clients (claimants). Hence, by bearing such a
substantial litigation risk, US type lawyers can exercise plenary

40. Antonio Gidi, Class Actions in Brazil – A Model for Civil Law Countries, 51 AM. J.
COMP. L. 311, 334, 348 (2003). See also Hensler, supra note 1, at 7.
41. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3).
42. Id.
43. Thomas J. Miceli, Do Contingent Fees Promote Excessive Litigation? 23 J. LEGAL
STUD. 211, 211-12 (1994).
44. John C. Coffee, Jr., Reforming the Securities Class Action: An Essay on Deterrence
and Its Implementation, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1534, 1545-47 (2006).
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control over important decisions.45 The contingency fee is usually
one-third to forty percent of the judgment award, which is a
common practice in the United States. Here, the Author denotes “n”
as the contingency fee percentage, “JAu” as the generally higher US
judgment award, and “w” as the prevailing rate of the case, for
which the original functions for principals and agents are as
follows:
Benefit for Principal= w(Judgment award)
Bp= (1–n)w(JAu)
TCp=0
Benefit for Agent=Attorney fee=contingency fee percentage of
the judgment award
Ba=AF=nw(JAu)
TCa=CF+ICa

The contingency fee here is considered the benefit for the
attorney, and court fees and other investigations-related
information costs are assumed by the agent, so they are taken into
account as the transaction costs. Therefore, the utility function can
further be illustrated as follows:
(2.1) Up=(1–n)w(JAu)
(2.2) Ua=nw(JAu) –CF–ICa

The eventual utility for each claimant will end up positive
since principals do not have to bear costs when the case is lost, but
can receive a share of the judgment award if the case prevails. On
the other hand, if the case is lost, all the costs will be borne by the
attorneys. This makes it a zero-cost decision for the claimants.
Therefore, the attorneys will evaluate the benefit against the
possible risks and costs to decide whether to undertake the case,
and will reject it if the risk does not justify the gain against the cost.
Thus, for the Common Law Type, the class litigation carries little
risk for claimants and sets few barriers for entry, which effectively
enhances their willingness to claim compensation provided the
attorneys are willing to handle the case.

45. Macey & Miller, supra note 8, at 3.
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B. Civil Law Type A
As previously noted, Type A class actions are essentially
consensual group lawsuits adopting opt-in mechanisms. The
transaction cost for joining the class is high because each plaintiff
has to exert some effort in searching for attorneys and to be
included in the lawsuit. Additionally, negotiations among the
parties are required to elect the representative plaintiff and the
class counsel, which also increases the transaction cost. 46
Therefore, the sizes of the class are usually small, not the tens of
thousands of claimants as which are often seen in the common law
type.47 Meanwhile, since the class counsel does not have the same
controlling power as that in common law type of class actions, the
relevant bargaining costs (BCp & BCa) and the monitoring costs
(MCp) between the attorneys and their clients are substantial, too.
In terms of incentives, because contingency fee arrangements and
punitive damage awards are not common practice, the claimants
have comparatively low incentive to file suits even though the
information cost (ICp& ICa) is usually not as high as the common
law type due to different designs in evidence and civil procedure
laws. With respect to the court fees, as most of the civil law
countries adopt English rule, where it is allocated in the principal’s
function and is applied when the case is lost (1–w).48
On the other hand, while attorneys do not have the large
financial stakes incurred by the common law type, they receive
rewards for their legal services without risk by case or by an hourly
rate (AF). Therefore, the incentive for the attorneys is positive.
According to the aforementioned features, the utility function for
Type A can be elaborated as follows:
(3.1) Up=Bp–TCp=w(JAv) –ICp – BCp –MCp –CJ –(1–w)CF –AF
(3.2) Ua= AF– ICa–BCa

Since principals are responsible for choosing the
representatives and for bearing risks ranging from adducing
46 . Taiwan Code of Civil Procedure, Art. 44-2, JUDICIAL YUAN REPUBLIC OF CHINA
available
at
https://law.moj.gov.tw/ENG/LawClass/LawAll.aspx?pcode=B0010001
[https://perma.cc/7KZ4-GD9C].
47 . Hensler, supra note 2, at 306; KUO-CHANG HUANG, COLLABORATIVE CASE STUDY
PROJECT ON GLOBAL CLASS ACTION & GROUP LITIGATION, Appendix III (2011).
48. Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, The English Versus the American Rule on
Attorney Fees: An Empirical Study of Public Company Contracts, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 327, 327
(2013).
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evidence to the result of the case, advancing all the costs is a
significantly high entry requirement for the claimants, especially
when the prevailing judgment award (JAv) is moderate because of
the rarely utilized punitive damage award and petite class size.
Therefore, Type A class actions appear to be a poor choice for the
claimants.
C. Civil Law Type B
In Civil Law Type B class actions, the NPOs or GSOs provide
convenient means for potential claimants to opt-in the class.
Additionally, NPOs or GSOs usually have standing and can be the
representative plaintiffs and hire their own counsel, which saves
the cost of bargaining and monitoring between claimants and
representatives. Also, because these NPOs or GSOs are required to
register with the authorities, this to some extent warrants their
proficiency. Therefore, the transaction costs for plaintiffs to join
the lawsuit are lower compared to those incurred by Type A
(dICp& dMCp), as well as the bargaining cost between principals
and agents (dBCp & dBCa). More importantly, NPOs or GSOs
usually bear the relevant costs for claimants with external public
or private funding,49 which increases the incentive for claimants to
join such class actions. Because the risk and costs fall upon NPOs
or GSOs, the responsibility that the claimants must bear is rather
limited. On the other hand, while bearing costs, NPOs or GSOs enjoy
preferential treatment by the special laws regarding court fees
(d(1-w)CF), and in some areas, are even conferred with power in
obtaining evidences with less cost (dICa), 50 which is similar to
semi-public agencies. Lastly, in most situations, they do not claim
fees for their legal services according to special laws such as
consumer protection laws or investor protection laws.51 The utility
functions can again be re-illustrated as follows:

49. Camille Cameron & Jasminka Kalajdzic, Commercial Litigation Funding: Ethical,
Regulatory and Comparative Perspectives, 55 CAN. BUS. L. J. 1 (2014).
50. See Securities Investor and Future Trader Protection Act art. 34 (Taiwan). When
the protection institution files a lawsuit pursuant to Article 28 and applies for a provisional
injunction or a provisional attachment, the court may rule security exemption for such
action.
51 . Kuo-Chang Huang, Using Associations as a Vehicle for Class Action, in CLASS
ACTIONS IN CONTEXT: HOW ECONOMICS, POLITICS AND CULTURE SHAPE COLLECTIVE LITIGATION 7172 (Deborah R. Hensler et al. eds., 2016).
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(4.1) Up= w(JAv) –dICp – dBCp –dMCp
(4.2) Ua= AF*–dICa–dBCa–d(1–w)CF
*AF: from public or private funding

The comparison of the three types of class actions for
principals and agents can be obtained by referring to the table
below:
Table 1: Comparison of the utility functions among types of
class actions
Utility

Common Law

Civil Law Type A

Civil Law Type B

Principal

(1–n)w (JAu)

w(JAv)–ICp – BCp –

w (JAv) –dICp – dBCp –

MCp –CJ–(1–w)CF –AF

dMCp

AF– ICa–BCa

AF*–dICa–dBCa–d (1–

Agent

nw(JAu) –(1–w) CF –
ICa

w)CF

From the comparison, it is quite clear that Civil Law Type A
with the highest transaction cost is not ideal among all three types
because it produces the lowest utility for principals and agents.
The Type B class action, by creating similar benefits, substantially
reduces the entry barrier by diminishing the transaction costs for
class actions compared to Type A. The Common Law Type and Civil
Law Type B are comparatively favorable according to the model,
with higher benefits and lower transaction costs under the
consideration of risks and incentives. Also, the Common Law Type
has more contingencies related to the prevalence of the case and
apparently creates higher incentive and risk, while Type B is more
certain. However, they are still not perfect models. There are two
major concerns for the Common Law Type that need to be
addressed. First is the agency cost problem. This stems from a
concern that the lack of client monitoring might lead an
entrepreneurial attorney “serving his own interest at the expense
of the client.”52 There are several ways to reduce agency costs, such
as monitoring, bonding, or ethical obligation. 53 However, studies
52. See Macey & Miller, supra note 8.
53. Judith Resnik et al., Individuals Within the Aggregate: Relationships,
Representation, and Fees, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 296, 374 (1996).
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have shown that these methods may only have limited functions.54
Another way to reduce agency costs is to align the incentives of the
agent and client, where fee arrangements are the most intuitive
and the most common method.55 Nevertheless, from an economic
point of view, contingency fees do not provide a perfect incentive
because they externalize all of the costs but generate only part of
the benefits to the plaintiffs’ attorney. 56 It is believed that this
makes it likely for some cases to settle when it is in the interest of
class members to go to trial because the attorney can obtain a
relatively high fee by settling and avoiding the costs of trial.57 In
terms of other fee arrangements, while hourly fee arrangements
also permit opportunists to incur additional fees, because they also
encourage externalizing the cost of work, fee-for-service
arrangements (by case) also induce attorneys to internalize the
cost of additional time spent on the service and externalize the
benefits of doing so. While similar problems with the two types of
fee arrangements can occur in civil law jurisdictions, the stakes in
Common Law Type class actions are generally so large that they
magnify the problem. So far, there has not been a perfect shield that
can be applied against the abuses caused by the fee arrangements.
In fact, common law countries such as the United States have
adopted some other ways to reduce the agency costs problem, one
of which is conferring the court more power in litigation
procedures. 58 This includes the basic features of the
aforementioned common law class actions, such as class
certification, appointment of class counsel, and judicial review
over settlements and attorney fees. However, while the court is
given a stronger role and is entitled to encourage and advise
parties, its intervention reduces the benefit brought by advocacy
systems. 59 Additionally, judicial review may have problems of
inherent bias and uncertainty. 60 In particular, US courts usually
54. Id.
55. Id. at 384.
56. Id. at 338.
57. Andrew Rosenfield, An Empirical Test of Class-Action Settlement, 5 J. LEGAL STUD.
113, 120 (1976). Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, Attorney Fees in Class Action
Settlements: An Empirical Study, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 27, 27-78 (2004).
58. See Macey & Miller, supra note 8, at 27.
59. Mathias Dewatripont & Jean Tirole, Advocates, 107 J. POL. ECON. 1 (1999).
60. Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Judicial Review of Class Action Settlements
1 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 167 (2009).
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review attorney fees by using “lodestar” or “percentage” methods,
which are still similar to the hourly fee and contingency fee
arrangements. 61 Hence, similar problems are still there. In
securities class disputes, the Private Securities Litigation Reform
Act (“PSLRA”) was amended to realign the interests of parties by
conferring a greater role on institutional investors in litigation in
securities class actions.62 However, the same rationale cannot be
fully replicated to other types of class actions when there is usually
no specific plaintiff who has a comparatively large stake in other
class litigation.
Another problem that exists in the Common Law Type is the
problem of frivolous lawsuits. 63 Since aggregation of a lawsuit
increases the bargaining power of the plaintiffs, this turns the table
on the defendants, and puts the defendant in the position of being
rendered insolvent by a single trial—a large undiversifiable risk.64
Additionally, because the fee award relates to the recovery of the
case, attorneys will be more willing to go after large cases against
deep pocket defendants. Taking securities class actions as an
example, the evidence indicates that suits tend to correlate with
higher quality underwriters, which are associated with higher
quality offerings.65 This correlation demonstrates that something
other than merit drives plaintiffs’ attorneys. 66 Furthermore,
empirical studies show that most securities-fraud class actions are
frivolous.67 Defendants tend to reach a settlement even if the suits
are unmeritorious to control costs and maintain positive publicity.
This increases not only the cost of business, but also that of the
judicial system. Hence, even though the Common Law Type saves
transaction costs related to the initiation of claims, there is still no
perfect solution to the problems of how to preserve class benefits
and to eliminate frivolous lawsuits.
On the other hand, although Civil Law Type B may mostly be
exempt from the aforementioned problems associated with the
61. Judith Resnik et al., supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 340.
62. See Wang & Chen, supra note 34, at 141.
63. James Bohn & Stephen Choi, Fraud in the New-Issues Market: Empirical Evidence
on Securities Class Actions, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 903, 979 (1996).
64. See Silver, supra note 22, at 204.
65. Stephen J. Choi, The Evidence on Securities Class Actions, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1465,
1477-98 (2004).
66. Id.
67. Bohn & Choi, supra note 63.
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Common Law Type, some potential downsides still exist. If the
initiation of class actions relies exclusively on these NPOs, GSOs, or
even regulators to take the lead, the interests of the general public
might go unprotected. 68 First, most of the longstanding NPOs or
GSOs, although independent, must operate on modest donations or
membership fees.69 However, their primary tasks and objectives
are not to fund protracted litigation, but to conduct some nonprofit research or services for the benefit of their members. 70
When resources are limited, they have to prioritize potential
activities, and litigation might not be the choice. The absence of
class litigation undoubtedly curtails the effects of class actions,
including access to justice as well as compensation. Additionally, in
some situations, there could be a conflict of interest between the
organizations and the claimants that makes the NPOs or GSOs “less
appropriate as protectors” of the collective interests of claimants.71
VI. DETERRENCE EFFECT
In contrast, the US literature generally agrees that the
deterrence effect is one of the most important goals of class
actions.72 With the gradual acceptance of punitive damage awards,
with rigid and modest application, it is posited herein that the
deterrence effect of class actions is reflected to some extent in the
civil law context.
To determine whether the class action mechanism effectively
deters wrongful acts, the Author applies the formula (B= p * S) by
Becker used in criminal law for analyzing the deterrence effect and
apply it to class actions. Assuming that the defendant commits a
wrongful act, the apprehension rate “p” represents the probability
of the plaintiffs initiating a lawsuit seeking compensation. Sanction
“S” denotes the damage award that the court orders a plaintiff to
pay to the defendant. Lastly, benefit “B” would be the benefits that
a defendant may obtain by conducting such wrongful acts.
68. Ianika Tzankova, Collective redress in Vie d’Or: A reflection on a European Cultural
Phenomenon, in CLASS ACTIONS IN CONTEXT: HOW ECONOMICS, POLITICS AND CULTURE SHAPE
COLLECTIVE LITIGATION 128-31 (Deborah R. Hensler et al. eds., 2016).
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Myriam Gilles & Gary B. Friedman, Exploding the Class Action Agency Costs Myth:
The Social Utility of Entrepreneurial Lawyers, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 103, 110 (2006).
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A. Common Law Type
For the common law class actions, especially in the United
States, the judgment awards are relatively large, which provides a
larger sanction “S.” However, the apprehension rate is more
complicated because the mechanism will likely be driven not only
by the merits of the case, but also by the allure of a large amount of
compensation. If we exclude possible frivolous suits, the “p” would
be lower than it should be since lawyers would only undertake
cases that are likely to reimburse their costs, which is below the
actual number of meritorious cases. Therefore, “p” is uncertain in
the common law context. Additionally, to avoid the uncertainty of
the litigation outcome, defendants are likely to settle for a smaller
amount without going to trial. These factors result in a more
contingent or even diluted deterrence effect.
B. Civil Law Type A
As for Type A class action, because the transaction costs are
too high to create incentives for the claimants to initiate the suit,
the “p” is lowest among all types. Further, with less utilized
punitive awards and fewer aggregated claims, the sanctions “S” in
Type A are much lower than those in the Common Law Type.
Hence, the defendants have no incentive to correct their wrongful
behavior if the benefit from the violation is greater than the
sanction.
C. Civil Law Type B
On the other hand, for Civil Law Type B, under the conditions
of sufficient funding, NPOs or GSOs are more willing to pursue
cases according to the merits of the case rather than the potential
costs or rewards since they do not operate for profit. Therefore, the
apprehension rate is higher than Type A, or even higher than the
Common Law Type, at least in theory. Even though empirically, the
United States still holds the highest number of class action cases,
the results are influenced by factors beyond the comprehension
rate, i.e., a different legal tradition and the legal service
environment, etc. Although Type B has the same problem with the
comparatively low judgment awards due to infrequent application
of punitive damage, its overall deterrence effect is better than Type
A because of a higher apprehension rate.
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Table 2: Comparison of deterrence effects among types of class
actions
The Common Law

Civil Law Type A

Civil Law Type B

Type
Apprehension

 Median (excluding

 Lowest (TAC and

 High (the agent is

rate (p)

the rate of frivolous

INC analyses both

less likely to be

suits) /Largely

indicate a low

influenced by

influenced by S

likelihood to initiate

private interests)

the suit)
Sanction (S)

 High

 Low

 Low

In conclusion, with the low sanction and the lowest
apprehension rate, Type A class actions have failed to achieve the
objective of deterrence. In contrast, the Common Law Type and
Civil Law Type B, with higher apprehension rates, appear to be the
two better choices for the deterrence objective. However, which
one is more cost efficient, and which one is better for improving
behavior? While the Common Law Type has higher compensation
but a lower and more unpredictable apprehension rate, Civil Law
Type B has lower compensation but a higher apprehension rate.
The formula shows that enforcement effort (apprehension rate)
and sanctions are substitutes, meaning a lower level of
enforcement effort can be offset by increasing sanctions, which
economizes enforcement costs. 73 Therefore, the Common Law
Type saves more enforcement costs if not considering the costs
wasted on frivolous claims. However, scholars argue that when
individuals observe this probability with some random error, for
example, like the uncertain “p” in the Common Law Type, it may be
optimal to employ less than the maximum feasible sanction with a
greater probability of apprehension. 74 While raising the
probability is costly, it may improve behavior. 75 Therefore,
because Civil Law Type B is more ascertainable with regards to the
“p” and “S,” it is less risky and is more suitable for improving
behavior even though the cost is higher.

73. Becker, supra note 28, at 169.
74. Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Louis Kaplow, Optimal Sanctions when IndividualsaAre
Imperfectly Informed about the Probability of Apprehension, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 365, 368
(1992).
75. Id.
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VII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. Market/Contract Failure
From the foregoing economic analysis, Civil Law Type A
seems to fail in achieving all of the objectives of the class action
mechanism. In contrast, although the Common Law Type and Civil
Law Type B appear to be more favorable options, they exhibit some
deficiencies. In the Common Law Type, the problems of attorney
fee abuses and frivolous lawsuits have imposed social costs on the
public by entrepreneurial lawyers in the guise of class actions.
Type B still appears to have the issues of not providing enough
access to justice in class disputes when resources are limited,
which diminishes the other functions offered by class actions.
These unsolved problems in the Common Law Type and Type
B of class actions imply the issue of contract failure. Contract
failure, as described by Hansmann, “is likely to be a problem if
consumers seek to purchase public goods/service from profitseeking producers.”76 The literature indicates that class actions do
reflect to some extent the public good and public policy because:
(1) it takes longer to resolve class actions than most other types of
litigation and (2) class actions require the court to play a more
active monitoring role. 77 In class actions, regardless of whether
they are injunctive suits or damage suits, the benefited parties
usually go far beyond the party that brings the suit, which echoes
the viewpoint that “the efficiency in private enforcement is not the
same as efficiency in producing the social utility of enforcement.”78
B. Suggested Solutions
When facing contract failure problems, academics suggest
that NPOs are likely to be the more suitable suppliers. 79 This is
76. Henry B. Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, 89 YALE L. J. 835, 849
(1980). See generally RICHARD A. MUSGRAVE & PEGGY B. MUSGRAVE, PUBLIC FINANCE IN THEORY
AND PRACTICE (1976) (noting that public goods means it costs no more to provide the good
to many persons than it does to provide to one person because one person’s enjoyment of
the good does not interfere with the ability of others to enjoy it at the same time; second,
once the good has been provided to one person, there is no way to prevent others from
consuming it).
77. See Coffee, Jr., supra note 44, at 1534.
78. See Wang & Chen, supra note 34.
79. Hansmann, supra note 76, at 838.
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because, in contrast to profit-driven lawyers, NPOs, by nature,
prohibit the distribution of profits – the “non-distribution
constraint,” which makes an NPO lack the incentive to exploit
consumer welfare.80 Hence, an NPO is a better institutional design
“for solving the contract-failure problem in the production of
public goods and services.”81
However, non-profit organizations will not voluntarily
address contract/market failure and provide support for class
actions,82 similar to the previously identified issue of inadequate
enforcement problem with Type B. This justifies government
intervention, which mandates that market participants establish
NPOs or GSOs to fulfill the need for law enforcement.83 Meanwhile,
there might be concerns about whether using GSOs or NPOs will
reduce the benefits of advocacy systems. 84 In theory, only when
information collectors are the “judge and the party” at the same
time will this type of problem arise.85 The Author believe that Civil
Law Type B could be exempt from this problem because GSOs or
NPOs are still advocates as long as they are independent from any
of the parties in the proceedings. Additionally, although nonprofits might be expected to operate less efficiently than forprofits,86 the disparity in behavior is not overwhelming if proper
legal restraints or monitoring devices are applied.87
Another possible criticism might be that government support
may undermine the independence of NPOs or GSOs because of
potential financial connections and political intervention. 88
However, this concern could be solved by a certain degree of
independence from finance and politics, where NPOs or GSOs will
80. Id.
81. Yu-Hsin Lin, Modeling Securities Class Actions Outside the United States: The Role
of Non-Profit In The Case of Taiwan, 4 N.Y.U. J. L & BUS. 143, 186 (2007).
82. Lester M. Salamon, Partners in Public Service: Government-nonprofit Relations
in the Modern Welfare State 35-36 (1995).
83. Id.
84. Dewaterpont & Tirole, supra note 59.
85. See Rosenfield, supra note 57.
86 . See Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and
Economic Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777, 790 (1972).
87. See Hansmann, supra note 76. For example, state corporation law commonly
makes it difficult for entrepreneurs to take stock in firms they create as a means of
providing compensation for their future services.
88. Michael Lipsky & Steven Rathgeb Smith, Nonprofit Organizations, Government,
and the Welfare State, 104 POL. SCI. Q. 625, 629 (1989).
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be more likely to be exempt from interventions from the
government. Currently, Germany, Japan, Korea, and Taiwan have
adopted this type of class action mechanism.89 Relevant issues in
the ensuing practice are worth observing and further study.
Based on previous studies and an economic analysis, this
Essay presents a comparative economic analysis of the major types
of class actions and group litigation at the global level. Making
comparisons of the different legal systems is a great challenge, and
the Author believes there is no perfect model that can fully
illustrate every feature of all of the systems. However, it is still
important to take this first attempt to provide information as a
preliminary picture of an economic analysis of “class action family
trees,” which is important for transnational litigation, recognition,
and enforcement. Additionally, it may provide some insights for
countries, in accordance with their backgrounds and needs, to
choose or to conduct reform regarding class dispute resolution.

89. See Lin, supra note 81.

